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Abstract: “Global health” is an increasingly important area of research and practice, 
concerned with the profound implications of globalisation for individual and communal 
health (particularly in developing countries) and focused on achieving health equity for all 
people worldwide. As such, it is often viewed as overlapping with public health and, thus, 
conceptually distinct from the field of biomedicine and bioethics. Both fields bear an uneasy 
relationship with the field of human rights, which remains largely unexplored. The paper 
constructively utilises insight derived from theories of global legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism to argue, perhaps controversially, that recent developments in international 
biomedical law and bioethics, constitute an important phase in the constitutional construction 
of a global health law system. In doing so, the paper analyses the role of human rights in the 
growing constitutional autonomy and organization of global health. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to provide a novel conceptual framework for examining recent developments in 
global health law and for analysing the notion of a global health constitution. It contributes to increasingly 
prominent debates regarding post-traditional patterns of constitutional organisation, often bearing 
diversely on distinct legal spheres including discussions in public international law, medical- and public 
health law, and the sociology of law. Global health is understood broadly as “a field of [medical, 
cultural, and normative] practice, research and education focussed on health and the social, economic, 
political and cultural forces that shape it across the world…[and a] discipline (…) concerned with 
OPEN ACCESS
Laws 2015, 4 772 
 
 
health-related issues that transcend national boundaries and the differential impacts of globalisation” [1]. 
Despite an easily observed institutional and normative distinction between public health and medicine [2], 
as far as this paper is concerned, “global health” includes issues that directly or indirectly affect both 
health promotion in populations and clinical care and treatment of individuals [3]. Consequently, global 
health governance (GHG) describes “the use of formal and informal institutions, rules, and processes by 
states, intergovernmental organisations, and non-state actors to deal with challenges to health that 
require cross-border collective action” [4]. Governance activities involve substantive goals—ends the 
societies want to achieve—and procedural mechanisms—how the societies organize the pursuit of their 
goals. The substantive goals and procedural mechanisms combine to give structure to governance 
activities [5]. As such, global health governance is closely linked with global health law (GHL), which 
can be defined as a system of legal [6] norms concerning the promotion of health and organisation of 
healthcare for the global population1. Law is viewed in functional terms as a system stabilising 
normative counterfactual expectations over time, rather than a set of norms adherent to a particular  
form of international law. It is the autonomous emergence and constitutional formation of the legal 
system regulating global health—largely overlooked in analytical discussions—that is the subject of the 
following analysis. 
There are three main reasons why a discussion about a global health constitution is crucial at this 
point. First, global health faces a number of difficult practical challenges, including: (a) the vast expansion 
of health concerns, ranging from HIV/AIDS, malaria, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) to 
non-communicable diseases, obesity and mental health issues [7–11]; (b) globalisation of ecological 
and sanitary risks through technological advances; (c) the actual and predicted substantial climate 
change exacerbation of health hazards in the coming decades; (d) the structural changes in global health 
governance and funding2; and finally (e) the digitisation and globalisation of medical research and 
health care services. This rise in interest and funding in global health facilitated admirable achievements, 
such as meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target on drinking water ahead of 
schedule, the end of polio transmission in India, or the dramatic reduction of the number of people 
contracting HIV/AIDS every year. However, this unprecedented engagement has still left most 
problems unsolved and today the provision of, and access to, health care3 in low- and middle-income 
countries continue to cause 20 million deaths annually, mostly among the world’s poor [14]. Eradicating 
                                                          
1  Whether GHG is to be seen as including or just overlapping with GHL is a matter of some debate. The author takes the 
view that the two systems are overlapping. An example of legal norms which—as will be argued here—would be part 
of GHL, but not necessarily be associated with GHG are norms created by decisions of national constitutional or 
supreme courts concerning health, or administrative/procedural norms allowing for such litigation to occur. 
2  Global governance for health is understood as “the collection of rules, norms, institutions, and processes that shape the 
health of the world’s population”. See: [12]. 
3  The distinction between “health care systems” and “global health” adopted in this paper follows the differentiation 
made by Daniels between the right to health care and the right to health. According to Daniels “the right to health care” 
includes both the right medical services and public health measures, whereas “the right to health” is defined more 
broadly as a way to characterise functionally the relevant, socially controllable actions that affect population health and 
its distribution. See: [13]. Due to the fact that the field of global health clearly exceeds health care services which are 
predominantly delivered at the national level, this papers refers to health care systems at the national level and global 
health system at the international/global level. 
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poverty and persisting health inequalities remains one of the most important goals in the recently 
adopted post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda4. Second, at present, global health law and 
governance are seen as institutionally, normatively and thematically fragmented. This fragmentation  
has been closely linked to the increasing dominance of non-state actors in international health  
policy, accompanied by a simultaneous dramatic decline of the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
leadership [15,16]. It has been illustrated for instance in the increasingly complex interplay between 
horizontal and vertical health systems [17]. The institutional and normative plurality is often seen as 
hindrance to the creation and sustainment of effective and coherent responses to the above-mentioned 
global health challenges ([11], p. 1). Despite the WHO reforms, almost all depictions of global health 
bear a sense of failure and continuous crisis5 This constitutes a substantial obstacle if global health 
system is to be capable of negotiating its position, and becoming reliable partner for political co-ordination 
efforts in a global—if thoroughly fragmented—constitutional order. 
Last but not least, despite its increased prominence on the international agenda and many academic 
debates among public health experts, lawyers and sociologists, there have been few attempts to develop a 
comprehensive conceptualisation of the developments in the field of global health law [9]. Most public 
international and global/transnational law [20–24] 6  scholars address quite general problems of 
global/transnational constitutionalism and fragmentation, and in most cases they engage with issues of 
global health and global health law only peripherally, usually as one aspect of wider accounts of WTO, 
IP law, human rights, or environmental protection [25–27]. This is intensified by the fact that public 
and private forms of transnationality are considered in two separate discourses [28]. A similar schism 
can also be observed in discussions about global health law, which is often seen either as tantamount to 
public health law7, or global health governance ([2], pp. 3–41). Public health lawyers usually focus on 
                                                          
4  UN General Assembly Resolution A/70/L.1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,  
25 September 2015, A/RES/70/1. 
5  Global Health and Foreign Policy, United Nations res. 63/33, United Nations A/RES/64/108 (27 January 2009). The 
future of financing for WHO: World Health Organization: reforms for a health future: World Health Assembly 
A64/INF.DOC./5 (12 May 2011); See also: [18,19]. 
6  For the purposes of this paper, the terms global and transnational will be used interchangeably for the following 
reasons. On the one had, global law has been defined by Teubner as a new body of law that emerges from various 
globalization processes in multiple sectors of civil society independently of the laws of the nation states. See: [20]. As 
such it is focused on non-state, private systems of governance. Furthermore, according to Kingsbury the term “global” 
(in Global Administrative Law) includes informal institutional arrangements and other normative practices and sources 
that are not encompassed within standard conceptions of “international law”, but can be conceptually derived from 
national administrative (i.e., public) law principles (see: [21]). At the same time, the term “transnational law” was 
defined by Jessup as “all law, which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private 
international law are included, as are other rules, which do not wholly fit into such standard categories”. See: [22]. Today, 
transnational law is often seen ‘as a myriad web and “assemblage” of intertwining, both public and private, that is 
hybrid, forms of regulation that can no longer be easily associated with one particular country or, for that matter, one 
officially mandated rule making authority’. Those who subscribe to this view treat transnational law as conceptually 
distinct from national and international law because its primary sources and addressees are neither nation state agencies 
nor international institutions founded on treaties or conventions, but private actors involved in transnational relations. 
In this latter sense transnational law clearly overlaps and can be seen as tantamount to global law. See: [23]. See also [24]. 
7  See [29]. The distinction between public health law and medical law will be examined at a later point in this paper. 
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particular regulatory problems (HIV/AIDS, pandemics, tobacco control, non-communicable diseases), 
while global health governance scholars are preoccupied with the institutional and organisational 
layout. Despite close links between global health law and governance, theorisations of both fields 
remain remarkably separate. Human rights lawyers and moral philosophers interested in issues of 
individual and global justice usually occupy the analytical space between these discourses. At the same 
time, legal, ethical, and sociological studies of biomedicine8 tend to focus, also in relative isolation 
from each other, on very particular themes, such as medical research, genetics and genomics, or 
assisted reproduction. In short, despite the proliferation of legal norms, thus far there is little research 
that examines how health care norms are shaped and implemented, and what the wider unifying 
normative features of global health might be. This constitutes a theoretical gap in a number of fields of 
research, and it has relevance, not only for public health experts, but also for constitutionalists and 
transnational lawyers, and legal theorists. 
This paper aims to address this gap. It attempts to answer three urgent questions: (1) Is  
coherent theorisation of a global health law system possible? (2) Can we observe the process of 
constitutionalisation9 of the global health regime? (3) And, if so, what are its features and patterns of 
development? In addressing these questions the paper’s underlying explanatory aim is to examine the 
legal dimension of global health system, i.e., whether recent forms of juridification of global health, 
reflected for instance in the consolidation of health rights jurisprudence, amount to constitutionalisation 
of global health. The paper constructively utilises insight derived from theories of legal fragmentation, 
global legal pluralism, and transnational and/or global constitutionalism, which acknowledge “the 
incommensurability of authority claims—in particular of the discrete claims to final authority over the 
interpretation and extent of jurisdiction of the various political units”10 and share the vision of “the 
disorder of orders—countless analytical and normative proposals competing for influence” [32]. Within 
this framework, Gunther Teubner’s concept of self-constitutionalisation of “social fragments” [33] 
provides a useful starting point and language for discussion [34]. Teubner acknowledges that at the 
domestic/state level societal orders constitute themselves in parallel with politics and develop their 
identity and formal rationality through a slow and complex process of specialisation. At the global level, 
however, societal constitutionalism actually involves non-political constitutionalisation of global 
governance in which “private actors not only participate in the political power processes of global 
governance, but also establish their own regimes outside of institutionalized politics” ([33], p. 9). In 
Teubner’s view, constitutionalism has the potential to “effectively limit [the] destructive effects” ([33], 
p. 1) of expanding subsystems in global society and to react to crises or threats to individual or 
institutional autonomy created by sectors such as global economy, education, science, technology, and 
medicine. Thus, constitutionalism is linked with both the private sphere and the transnational realm. In 
this respect, global health law constitutes a fascinating, yet challenging subject of analysis, because its 
                                                          
8  The term “biomedicine” here is neutral and carries no pejorative connotation to a specific model of health care. Rather, 
it describes the branch of medicine that uses and develops new technologies in medicine, and stands at the intersection 
of health and science. 
9  The concept of “constitutionalisation” describes the emergence of constitutional law within a given legal order. It 
implies that a constitution or constitutional law can come into being in a process extended through time. It may be, in 
short, a constitution-in-the-making. 
10  See [30]. For an overview of pluralist theories: [31]. 
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recent unprecedented expansion encompasses not only the private, but also the public sphere. The 
relevance the public sphere (public law and politics) for the constitutionalisation of global health casts 
some doubt over Teubner’s vision of private orderings. 
Nevertheless, first and foremost, the approach taken in this paper offers unique analytical lens for 
examining the dynamic processes of system formation within particular functional regimes emerging at 
the global level. Moreover, it helps construct coherent conceptualisation of the prima facie chaotic 
expansion of legal, ethical and professional norms created by public, private, and semi-private actors 
in the field of global health. As a result, these developments can be viewed, not necessarily as yet 
another crisis or a systemic failure, but rather, as a new stage in the growing constitutional autonomy 
and organization of global health law. For the purposes of this paper, a constitution is viewed to 
provide “a basis for stabilisation of the systems in question through legal means, as well as for the 
establishment of reflexive mechanisms capable of ensuring that they exercise self-restraint to a degree 
which leads to a reduction in negative externalities, asymmetries and crowding-out effects vis-à-vis 
other systems” ([28], p. 314). This understanding necessarily departs from the traditional definition, 
which perceives a constitution as “the sum of basic legal norms which comprehensively regulate the 
social and political life of a polity” [35]. However, the adopted conception helps to address the “open 
source anarchy” of global governance [5] and capture the complex developments occurring in the 
realm of transnational law. Additionally, although admittedly formalistic, it does not preclude the 
existence of values and principles underlying the processes of constitutionalisation of global health. At 
the same time, despite the undeniable relevance of values such as global health justice and equity, the 
focus of this paper is not the content of the constitutional principles, but the processes contributing to 
the emergence of a new field of transnational law. 
The first section of the paper sets the development of global health law against a political and 
regulatory background highlighting the inner fragmentation of global health regime. In this context  
it briefly considers the “constitutional” aspects of regime formation. Subsequently, the paper assesses 
global health in light of essential criteria of sectorial constitutions. It is argued here, perhaps 
controversially, that, although the constitutional construction of global health is far from complete, it is 
possible to observe an increasing level of constitutional order in some areas of global health law, such 
as HIV/AIDS or biomedical law. At the same time, as the analysis proceeds and recent developments 
in the global health system are considered, points of contention, where global health law escapes 
straightforward categorisation and classification in terms of constitutional theory are identified, and the 
questions for future research are outlined. Establishing all of these issues is far from straightforward. 
The following analysis does not offer (or indeed advocate) unity, uniformity, or even harmonisation of 
global health law, but it is an attempt to “compose a mosaic, which is not done by throwing various 
pieces haphazardly, but by combining them such that they create as harmonious a design as  
possible” [36]. A normative vision of global health law provides a necessary template for that mosaic. 
2. Conceptual Quandaries over the Global Health Law System 
2.1. Institutional and Normative Fragmentation of the Global Health System 
Since the adoption of the WHO Constitution in 1948, global health has been usually associated with 
the World Health Organisation as the undisputed leader in the field. As stated in its Constitution the 
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WHO is destined to “act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work”11. It 
is often claimed that it should act as an umbrella health agency convening legal and non-legal activities 
of different organisations providing thereby a more effective collective management [15,16]. The 
Constitution was intended to set out formal foundations for the operation of the WHO and guarantee 
coherency of the global health system. However, the internal consistency turned out to be illusory, and 
it soon transpired that other actors, such as UNICEF, would also claim authority and expertise over 
health issues, such as immunisation programmes or maternal health (the regulation of breast milk 
formula) [37]. The position of the WHO was later further undermined by globalisation and the emergence 
of new stakeholders, including governmental and non-governmental organisations, philanthropic 
foundations, professional networks, religious groups, private-public partnerships, and private companies. 
Instead of reforming and strengthening existing organisations with explicit health mandates, greater 
energy has gone into creating new actors and expanding the mandates of others [38]. One of the causes 
of this proliferation can be traced back to market-driven global economic policies associated with 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and extended intellectual property rights implemented  
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As part of the push toward increased 
commercialization in health care systems and trade openness, SAPs sought to redirect foreign aid to 
NGOs and away from governments. The World Bank, US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and other major donors began channelling large proportions of their health funding to private 
actors, thus, strengthening the delivery of health care through vertical health systems. It is often argued 
that this reconceptualization of health politics and funding has undermined the grand vision of 
comprehensive primary health care promoted by the WHO [39], some of the traditional structures 
designed to address cross-border health concerns ([11], p. 1) and health reforms in low-income 
countries [40]. At the same time, the health sector has resisted attempts to measure its efficiency and 
effectiveness, avoiding close monitoring and accountability. This situation has led to fierce criticism by 
global health experts including Gostin, who aptly observes that “[t]here is deep fragmentation of global 
health actors, such that there is vast duplication of effort (think of endless reports that health ministries 
must compile for different partners). Global health institutions have failed to articulate clear objectives 
and take steps to accomplish desired common goals. Priorities are badly skewed, such that funding and 
programs are disproportionately targeted to politically popular programs and the latest high profile 
disease (think of SARS, influenza, and bioterrorism) rather than the global burden of disease (think of 
cancer, heart disease, mental health, and injuries). Health often is given inadequate weight in other 
regimes, such as trade and investment, despite their impact on health”12. However, not for everyone 
the situation is as grim as for Gostin. For instance, Fidler views recent changes as a shift from 
state-centric “old-school anarchy” to pluralistic and unstructured “open source anarchy”; from a 
Westphalian to a post-Westphalian context, in which both States and non-State actors shape responses to 
transnational health threats and opportunities. Moreover, interestingly, Fidler notes a deep paradoxical 
causal link between the absence of architecture for global health and the growing importance of health in 
                                                          
11  Art. 2 (a) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, New 
York (19–22 June 1946) (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100), entered into force on  
7 April 1948. 
12  See ([3], p. 30) and see the system as frequently ineffective, increasingly chaotic, and highly dysfunctional. 
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global politics over the last 20 years. According to Fidler, “open-source anarchy allows all manner of 
actors to access, adopt, apply, and adapt to the source code for global health, creating a governance effect 
far more vigorous than WHO ever managed to create as an intergovernmental organization” ([5], p. 10]). 
At the same time, however, Fidler acknowledges that open-source anarchy creates enormous difficulties 
for the task of building and maintaining adequate public health infrastructures locally, nationally, and 
internationally. Despite the globalization of public health, the political and financial responsibility for 
public health infrastructure and capacity falls on governments. Alas, open-source anarchy constitutes a 
serious obstacle in building sustainable capacity for public health within and between states ([5], p. 13). 
This is where questions about law become crucial. 
The law created in this heterogeneous environment has been said to be developing in an 
uncoordinated, amorphous, and incomplete manner, forming a system, which is ineffective and highly 
dysfunctional [2]. States (and non-state actors) frequently fail to comply with stipulated legal rules and 
change their behaviour as a result of a treaty or a declaration ([9], p. 438) What exacerbates the 
practical and conceptual difficulties is the extraordinary proliferation of soft-law instruments and other 
forms of regulation, accompanied by perhaps comparatively modest number of traditional international 
law provisions and latent processes of juridification13. Despite WHO’s astounding normative powers, 
modern international health law is remarkably thin. There currently exist three legally binding international 
health instruments (International Classification of Disease 1948, International Health Regulations 
(IHRs) [41], and WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003 (FCTC) [42]), and two of 
them predate WHO. These instruments are often characterised by “structural weaknesses—e.g., vague 
standards, ineffective monitoring and weak enforcement—and a ‘statist’ approach that insufficiently 
harnesses the creativity and resources of non-state actors and civil society” ([2], p. 240). Their impact 
is severely weakened by the fact that they provide no financial or technical support to do so, member 
states may reject or submit reservations to their provisions, and most importantly they lack enforcement 
mechanisms for addressing compliance failure ([9], p. 435). For instance, one analysis of the IHRs 
effectiveness over their 56-year history concluded that, due to poor national surveillance systems and 
protection measures, they had been relatively ineffective in achieving their main goals [43]. On the 
other hand, the FCTC remains the first and only legally binding global health treaty. It was criticised 
with regard to its formation and content [44]. Together with other WHO instruments it still neglects 
rights-based terminology [45] and it covers an extremely limited subject matter, which prevents it from 
being a centre of an emerging global health regime. Consequently, some argue that despite numerous 
legislative attempts, like the joint WHO/UNICEF Alma-Ata Declaration 1978 [46], the WHO has been 
reluctant to pursue international law and human rights approaches to public health issues14. This 
standpoint can be supported by the fact that it was the UN Assembly and UNESCO, and not the WHO, 
that adopted the three famous international human rights instruments in the area of biomedicine and 
bioethics, discussed below [47,48]. Similarly, it is now the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), which has recently assumed quasi-adjudicative functions over the right to 
                                                          
13  “Juridification” is a term used by Teubner (2012) and it seems to be tantamount to “legalisation” used by Klabbers 
(2009) and Krisch (2010) to describe proliferation of treaties and the creation of ever more courts and tribunals. 
Despite subtle differences they will both be used interchangeably. 
14  See [43]. It is worth mentioning that it was UNESCO and not WHO, who adopted the three human rights instruments 
in the area of genetics and bioethics. 
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health at the international level1516. Finally, field of global health remains predominantly “soft”, in that 
it is dominated by declarations, communications, recommendations, resolutions, codes of practice, 
guidelines, notices, and positions17. However, it is also becoming increasingly entangled with various 
sources of obligation—including national law (assisted reproduction laws), other international law 
regimes (WTO, environmental law, ILO, World Bank), regulations of international organisations (WHO, 
UNAIDS, UNESCO), contracts between private parties or informal rules and institutional arrangements. 
This institutional and normative fragmentation obscures the determination of the normative character of 
global health law [4,51]. This is most probably one of the reasons why, although global health should be 
a major focus of international law, sadly that has not been the case. Of course, this is not to say that 
debates about global health never enter the international arena. On the contrary, attempts to conceptualise 
recent developments and design possible solutions to global health challenges have been mounting. 
These responses can be divided into normative and analytical. 
2.2. Responses to Fragmentation of the Global Health System 
As far as normative responses are concerned, prominent voices have called for more unity through 
harmonisation, co-ordination, and synchronisation of the area. These calls highlighted the need to 
create “the scaffolding to sustain healthy, ecologically sound, and equitable global systems” and a more 
“holistic approach to the global architecture of health aid” [52] have been made to “constitute the 
scaffolding to sustain healthy, ecologically sound, and equitable global systems” [53]. For many years 
global health scholars and practitioners have been advocating the idea of codification via a legally 
binding global health treaty. In April 2011 it seemed that their call shave been finally heard, when the 
United Nations General Secretary, Ban Ki Moon, asked political leaders “to commit to global solidarity, 
built on the tenets of shared responsibility, true national ownership and mutual accountability...and set the 
stage for a future United Nations Framework Convention on Global Health” [54]. A framework 
convention would use a bottom-up inclusive process to inter alia: (1) set globally-applicable norms 
and priorities for health systems and essential human needs; (2) effectively govern the proliferating 
number of actors and activities; (3) create methods for holding state and non-state actors accountable 
to the right to health obligations, including for monitoring progress and achieving compliance with the 
Framework Convention on Global Health (FCGH) itself; and (4) devise a process for the international 
community to establish further commitments beyond those in the initial Convention ([12], pp. 74–75). 
However, almost five years later, the FCGH still remains in a remote plan and it is to be seen whether, 
and if so when, it will become a legal reality. Doubts over feasibility and appropriateness of such 
proposals are reinforced by Fidler’s metaphor of the open source anarchy, in which health’s role in 
global affairs can no longer be captured politically or analytically through a single governance structure 
or distinct architectural framework. Furthermore, according to Fidler “the process of bringing order to 
                                                          
15  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights 1966, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 63/117, 10 December 2008. 
16  It was also the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that issued the General Comment No. 14: [49]. 
17  This proliferation is well illustrated, for instance, on the WHO website enumerating guidelines and codes of practices 
issued by the organization on different subjects. The most famous one issued recently is the WHO Global Code of 
Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, at [50]. 
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unstructured plurality confronts the resistance of both States and non-State actors to have their 
prerogatives and freedom of action restrained. We are familiar with such resistance from States under 
old-school anarchy, but those interested in global health governance should not underestimate the 
wariness with which non-State actors would view attempts to rationalize, centralize, and harmonize their 
involvement in global health” ([5], p. 8). Fidler conceptualisation of global health governance is 
analytically closely linked to theories of global fragmentation, legal pluralism, and global/transnational 
constitutionalism. However, because he seems to view law as one of many tools used in global 
governance, the relevance of legal norms in the development of the global health system remains largely 
unexplored. As will become clear from the following analysis, theories of global fragmentation and 
transnational constitutionalism have the potential to refocus debates in the field of global health and 
address the questions posed at the beginning of this paper.  
2.3. Global Health through the Lens of Global Pluralism and Transnational Constitutionalism 
There have been numerous attempts to theorise fragmentation and pluralisation of law and “the Great 
Legal Complexity of the World” [55]. The International Law Commission (ILC) Study Group, which 
adopted a more traditional understanding of international law, analysed the emergence of so called 
“self-contained” systems [56], established around functionally specialized international organizations. 
In a broad sense such “special regimes” ([57], para. 365) constitute a group of primary rules and 
principles concerned with a particular subject matter that is applicable as lex specialis, i.e., that is able 
to seek precedence in regard to the secondary rules provided by general international law. ILC 
identified different possible criteria for identifying such regimes18, including, the presence of a special 
set of (secondary) rules concerning breach of a particular group of (primary) rules [59], rules for the 
creation, interpretation, application, modification, or termination of rights and obligations, covering a 
special subject matter set out in a single treaty, several treaties, or treaty plus non-treaty developments 
(such as subsequent practice or customary law), and effectiveness [60]. Prima facie, global health law 
seems a perfect candidate to be classified as a self-contained regime. After all, the institutionalisation 
of global health has been taking place gradually for a long time. First general rules and standards 
developed to govern sanitation and trade-related health concerns as well as rapid scientific discoveries 
during the 19th century. This period was dominated by the development of domestic state public health 
interventions [61]. The second wave marks the consolidation of norms and standards at the end of 
World War II with the creation of the WHO and assisted UN specialized agencies working on health 
provisions, as well as the occurrence of NGOs dealing with health as a part of development and 
reconstruction. This seems to have been the time when the formation of a self-contained regime was 
most likely to happen. Finally, further institutionalisation took place in the early 2000s with the rise of 
private-public partnerships ([51], p. 27). It is legitimate to ask whether this institutionalisation lead 
also to juridification of the area and the formation of a self-contained regime. The earlier account of 
global health law might cast great doubt on this issue. First, as mentioned above, the leadership role of 
the WHO has been contested over the years. Secondly, it is impossible to identify a specific treaty 
                                                          
18  The ILC preferred the term ‘special regime’ over ‘self-contained regime’, since no evidence is found supporting a full 
exclusion from general international law. However, as the latter notion has been adopted in case law and scholarship it 
will be used here. For detailed definition see: [58]. 
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outlining rights and obligations as well as secondary rules that would form a lex specialis to general 
international law principles19. Global health law remains fragmented and lacks a common legal point 
of reference to appeal to for resolving its internal or external conflicts. Third, there is no separate 
adjudicative body that would seek to interpret existing rules concerning global health and provide 
some kind of dispute resolution. The WHO has never used the dispute procedure outlined in its 
Constitution, and it remains to be seen whether the UN CESCR successfully exercises its new powers 
set out by the 2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. Finally, with regard to the third understanding of 
the self-contained regime, the identification of particular “branches of international law” has become 
increasingly difficult. The shift towards multisectorialism and the involvement of global financial 
institutions and private bodies in global health governance make such delineation extremely challenging. 
Therefore, from a classical public international point of view, the system of global health law, despite 
displaying some features of a self-contained regime, would most probably escape such a categorisation. 
Today the debate in international law has moved forward, away from self-contained regimes ([58], 
para. 152). They are now understood as interrelated sub-systems in the field of international law with 
relationships to both general international law and other sub-systems in the international law. Theories 
of global pluralism and transnational constitutionalism analyse a legal system, that is not simply the 
inter-state system, where a convincing rule of recognition has not been formulated, the institutions for 
“adjudication” are often non-judicial and sometimes absent, and the processes of change are not easily 
articulated in terms of rules [62]. In general, the discourse revolves predominantly around the concept of 
legitimacy, effectiveness, fundamental values, and different foci of authority. However, the criteria of 
legal validity and regime formation proposed by these theories vary substantively from more formalistic 
models to very pluralised and flexible. For instance, for Neil Walker levels of constitutional consolidation 
will depend on: (a) the adoption of a self-conscious constitutional discourse; (b) the assertion of 
sovereignty; (c) the development of jurisdictional scope; (d) a claim to interpretive autonomy; (e) the 
exercise of a residual institutional capacity; (f) the specification of the incidents of citizenship of the 
polity; (g) and the construction of mechanisms, such as representation, for realizing that citizenship [63]. 
In contrast, according to Krisch, pluralist models have a broader appeal than constitutionalism in the 
construction of postnational authority and law as they reflect the need for multiplicity and stress the 
value of fluidity and openness. “Pluralism occupies a middle ground between hard, legalized and softer 
network forms of cooperation and thus combines greater flexibility with those of (limited) hierarchical 
instruments” [64]. In the pluralist world conflicts are solved through convergence, mutual accommodation 
or not at all. Kingsbury, on the other hand, focuses on normative coordination and institutionalization 
concerned with the administration of general public goods (i.e., with “global administrative law”) and 
proposes a substantive validity paradigm based on the notion of “publicness” reminiscent of Fuller’s 
concept of law. The notion of “publicness” is helpful for the analysis of global health law to the extent to 
which the latter regulates the administration of health care. In becomes clear that in this respect some 
aspects of global health law could be characterised as global administrative law. Nevertheless, this 
approach has also certain important limitations. It precludes the analysis of these aspects of global health 
                                                          
19  That conceptual frame constituting a starting point for the ILC’s Report was provided by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT) (23 May 1969), entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series,  
1155: 331. 
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law, which falls outside administrative law, including contracts and other forms of obligations, which 
proliferate in the context of cross-border flow of patients, doctors, and funds, and which play an 
important role in the development of global health law. Consequently, it is not conducive to an in-depth 
systematic study focused exclusively on global health law. What is appealing in Teubner’s vision is that 
it is operational: regimes are not founded by anyone or anything, and they are a sum of communicative 
operations of different actors. A constitution is seen first and foremost as a living communicative 
process. Its main objective and role is not so much to impose unity upon the regime (which as we have 
already established is unattainable), but to construct its identity with the assistance of law. It is in this 
respect, that Teubner’s concept of societal constitutionalism becomes a useful point of reference and 
providing language for further analysis. 
Societal constitutionalism based on the idea of self-constitutionalisation of functional systems is the 
response to the monetarisation, scientification, and medicalisation of society ([35], p. 24). At the 
national level, constitution law is necessary to stabilise the spontaneously reproducing and conflicting 
systems. When functional regimes (economy, science, medicine) become global, pressure exerted by 
the state to set limits and navigate their outward expansive tendencies and regulate the conflicts 
between regimes disappears. The lack of political or legal framework facilitating internal and external 
communication, can lead to an unprecedented expansion of the system. For example, absence of clear 
legal rules concerning extraterritorial liability of states and private actors can have serious negative 
effects on the health of patients who receive healthcare abroad and healthcare professionals, who 
provide it. Another example would be the continuous failure to deal effectively with epidemics, including 
HIV/AIDS, allegedly stemming from the discrepancy between the expansion of global health actors 
like UNAIDS, Global Fund, BMGF on the one hand, and very limited legal commitments on the other. 
Of course, alternatively, it could be argued that Teubner’s interpretation of the developments at the 
global/ transnational realm fails in the context of global health, because in the field of global health 
“constitutional moments” occur not as a result of regime expansion, but as consequence of external 
factors. Some could say that human health is by definition fragile and pandemics like Ebola or  
H1N1 (swine flu) are simply inevitable periodic occurrences. Other would argue (more convincingly) 
that many, if not most, illness could be prevented or cured, if health care systems were not constantly 
undermined by the excessive growth of the free market economy. Accepting this reasoning  
thus undermines the basic premises of societal constitutionalism, which traces the need for 
self-constitutionalisation back to the system itself. It would also seem to question the response to 
crisis. While self-constitutionalisation is said to aim at limiting the expansionist tendencies of a 
system, in the area of global health the response to a crisis is always more health care, not less. Law is 
usually created to extend health systems and strengthen the delivery of health services. It is difficult to 
disagree with such analysis. However, certain reservations have to be made, because the realities of 
global health are even more complex and may nevertheless lend some weight to the argument that the 
expansion of the global health system may lead to a constitutional moment. An example would be the 
establishment and development of vertical and horizontal health systems. Vertical programmes created 
to tackle specific health problems, funded and operated by IOs, NGOs and private actors, have 
dominated health systems in some developing countries, leading to their deterioration and collapse of 
horizontal systems, which usually lack funding and support [65]. Calls for legal regulation of this area 
do highlight the need for structural changes in the delivery of healthcare rather than the expansion of 
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anyone of these types of systems. According to Teubner, it is at that moment that the pressure for 
global self-foundation (and autonomisation) increases and reveals its “jurisgenerative potential”, and  
it is then that subsystems of world society are beginning to develop their own constitutional legal 
norms ([66], p. 59). Full sectorial self-constitutionalisation is impossible without legal norms enabling 
and supporting the accomplishment of system’s full autonomy ([35], p. 107). However, Teubner 
distinguishes juridification from constitutionalisation of a functional regime and sets certain criteria 
against which the latter should be assessed. First of all, norms need to perform two main constitutional 
functions, namely provide for the self-foundation and self-limitation of the subsystem. Second, they 
have to maintain the internal differentiation of the system, which will accommodate certain constitutional 
arenas, i.e., the organised-professional sphere, the spontaneous sphere, and learning processes between 
them. Third, they have to sustain double reflexivity of the system, and through the development of 
constitutional processes (i.e., secondary norms), support the accomplishment of system’s autonomy. 
Last, but not least, they need to form constitutional structures, which will stabilise the constitutional 
function and processes in the constitutional arenas and enable the distinction between constitutional 
and non-constitutional norms. The following analysis of the global health regime demonstrates the 
existence of most of those elements, allowing us some optimism with regard to the formation of a 
global health constitution in the future. 
3. The Constitutional Development of Global Health Law 
3.1. Constitutional Moments in the Development of Global Health Law 
3.1.1. The Post-War Constitutional Foundations of International Health 
It can be argued that global health law like other global regimes does not strive towards a stable 
balance, but rather follows the chaotic pattern of a “dynamic disequilibrium” between contradictory 
developments: the autonomisation and the limitation of its functional logic ([33], p. 76). Freed from the 
framework and territorial boundaries of the nation state global health system exhibits tendency of 
expansion. As a result of scientific advancement new illnesses are being identified, new conditions 
medicalised, and new public health areas brought at the forefront of policy-making. This creates a 
pressing need for “cure”, i.e., more health care, more pharmaceutical products, treatments, and more 
medical research, which in turn generates new categories of disease. Similarly, in science, research 
generates uncertainties, which can only be solved by more research, in turn producing even more 
uncertainties. However, at the global level there are no state structures to balance, limit, and bring 
stability to these developments. Consequently, both regimes—medicine and science—are undergoing 
processes of self-reproduction and maximization of their particular rationalities, which become excessive. 
This specific growth compulsion can lead to a catastrophe. The experience of immediate crisis brings 
to the crucial realisation that self-restraint is vital. The need to formulate limitative rules becomes vital 
in order to counteract self-destructive tendencies and to limit the damage to social, human, and natural 
environment ([33], p. 76). This is when the “constitutional moment” ([35], p. 81) occurs. Teubner 
states that “this is not yet the moment when the self-destructive dynamics makes the abstract danger of 
collapse appear (…), it must be one minute before midnight” ([35], p. 82). It seems that in the 
development of global health law, there was not one, but a few such constitutional moments. The first 
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constitutional moment can be traced back to the Second World War, and some will argue that it came 
not before, but just “after midnight”, namely after the atrocities committed by doctors in the name of 
science or greater public good. The second one is associated with the global response to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic that led to the emergence of a new global health paradigm. Finally, the third, and most 
recent, constitutional moment has occurred in the context of the biotechnological revolution. This 
might come as a surprise, especially to those who associate constitutionalisation with some form of 
codification through treaty law, because apart from one binding regional document, i.e., the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, the area is populated by non-binding instruments or no 
international law at all. 
As a result of the catastrophe of the Second World War, some of the most important norms of the 
global health system have been adopted in the Nurnberg Code (1947) [67] and the WMA Helsinki 
Declaration on the Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964) [68]. 
They both established the principle of physical and mental inviolability and the ban of medical 
experimentation without consent. These rules have been then translated into Art. 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and subsequently developed by the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research involving human subjects (2002) [69]. Art. 7 is an important part of the ICCPR and has been 
designated as one of the provisions that is non-derogable and allows no limitation. The UN Human 
Rights Committee has made it clear that “no justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked 
to excuse a violation of Article 7 for any reasons”20. The above norms seem to simultaneously fulfil 
the two constitutional functions, namely they support the self-foundation and self-constraint of the 
system. In a sense then, the somewhat linear development of constitutional law stipulated by Teubner 
(i.e., first self-foundation of the system, and then its self-limitation) does not apply to the area of 
medicine and science. It could be said that the self-foundation of the health regime at the global arena 
as an autonomous system has been partly induced by the need for its self-limitation. 
Another manifestation of the post-war constitutionalisation was the adoption of the set of norms 
relating to the right to health. First of all, the establishment of the WHO was described as “an 
extraordinary advance in the evolution of international health institutions” and “the broadest and most 
liberal concept of international responsibility for health ever officially promulgated” [71]. In a most  
self-constituting fashion the WHO labelled its founding document (the WHO Constitution) a “Magna 
Carta of Health” [72]. The inclusion of a new “right to highest attainable standard of health” defined 
as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity” was surely directed at the creation of the internal rationale and identity of the global health 
care order. In the first 30 years of its existence the WHO has focused on a combination of vertical and 
horizontal health strategies culminating with the adoption of the Alma Ata Declaration in 1978 and the 
eradication of smallpox in 1980 [73]. The aim of the former was to reaffirm the right to health, but 
predominantly to consolidate the member state support for global health and reassert the central role of 
the WHO in the global health governance. The latter was seen as a triumph for the WHO in terms of 
its ability to effectively coordinate research alongside state interests and public-private investment. 
                                                          
20  See [70]. The issue of enforceability of Art. 7 arises in this respect, but it constitutes a problem of the whole human  
rights regime. 
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However, the recent proliferation of organisations getting involved in global health governance sets a 
trend that undermines initial successes. In fact, so many actors and organisations are involved that 
coordinating the bewildering array of initiatives and programmes becomes impossible [74]. 
Although the role of the WHO has diminished considerably over the years, and the definition of 
health has been severely criticised as vague and ambivalent, it contributed to the development and 
subsequent expansion of the regime and the inclusion of issues and dimensions such as poverty, 
inequality, gender, and stigma in the health agenda [66]. The right to health, rooted in Art. 12 ICESCR 
and greatly extended through the General Comment No. 14 (2000) to include health determinants, has 
provided a broad and flexible framework to deal with a number of health issues, ranging from access to 
treatment to bioterrorism. [75,76]. The right to health constitutes probably one of the most controversial 
human rights developed in the post-war order, yet it has been reproduced in different “shapes and 
forms” in numerous documents, some of which certainly carry a constitutional status [77]. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 called for a standard of living adequate to health and 
well-being in Art. 25(1), Art. 12 of the ICCPR 1966 enumerated the detailed state obligations in this 
regard, and more recently the Oviedo Convention 1997 promulgated “the equitable access to health 
care of appropriate quality” in Art. 3. The right to health has been often proclaimed to be a 
well-established part of international law ([77], p. 133). The four elements underpinning the right to 
health, i.e., availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality have constituted the basis for most 
global health actions. It also defined the global health regime’s rationale during disputes with 
WTO/TRIPS Agreements or the World Bank, which represented great examples of regime collisions. 
The attempts to define the communicative and normative boundaries of the global health regime 
through the right to health might not always have been successful, but despite endless criticism the 
right can still be seen as defining the regime’s distinct identity and supporting its autonomy. The 
association between health and the language of human rights has been exceptionally successful over the 
last years and is slowly pervading all areas, levels, and forms of global health [78,79]. It also supported 
the unprecedented expansion of health rights that coincided with their intensive judicialisation and 
constitutionalisation across the world [80,81]. The relevance of the right to health as the central notion 
of global health has been further considerably strengthened during the second period of 
constitutionalisation, instigated by the AIDS/HIV crisis. 
3.1.2. The HIV/AIDS Crisis and the Emergence of the Global Health Paradigm 
The outbreak of the AIDS/HIV pandemics constitutes another vital point in the constitutional 
development of the global health system. The experience of a major crisis and state of emergency that 
accompanied the outbreak of the pandemics and its subsequent development has been followed by an 
emergence of multiple non-state actors and an increased regulatory activity. Initiatives, such as the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), launched in 1994, the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, created in 2002, or the—to name only a few—have led to well-funded 
projects and fundamental changes in funding structure [82]. More recently, in June 2010 a new body, 
the Global Commission on HIV and the Law (“comprising eminent persons from public life”), was 
launched to develop human rights-based recommendations for effective HIV responses, complementing 
the UNAIDS High-Level Commission on HIV Prevention and supporting the achievement of the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [83]. This proliferation of global actors required a 
considerable amount of regulatory activity at the global level. All actors involved in the HIV/AIDS 
agenda (e.g., WHO, UN, UNAIDS, Global Fund, UNFPA, World Bank, etc.) started issuing political 
declarations (on HIV/AIDS 2001, 2006, 2011) [84], numerous policy reports, and various guidelines, 
including the WHO consolidated guidelines on the use of antiretroviral drugs for treating and preventing 
HIV infection [85]. Furthermore, far more effective standard-setting tools, such as procurement and 
supply management requirements [86] and quality assurance tools [87] have been used to award 
development grants and distribution of health services and products. Although no binding international 
treaties have been adopted, many would argue, the institutional and normative proliferation that has 
taken place within and outside the aegis of the UN and WHO was a key driving force behind the 
fundamental changes in the post-MDG global health landscape. 
These developments have certainly supported the self-foundation of a global health law regime and 
some would claim that it was in that moment that the new global health paradigm has emerged ([82], 
p. 137) Although the HIV/AIDS exceptionalism [88] followed by vast investment directed at tackling 
HIV/AIDS epidemics that ignored other important health issues (e.g., non-communicable conditions) 
have been heavily criticized [89], the proliferation of various actors and a new body of soft law 
regulation certainly marked a shift of constitutional importance in the field of global health. The 
mobilisation of the international community including especially high-income countries highlighted 
the link between the global health agenda and issues of global justice, which has since become one of 
the central motifs of the global health system. The sense of global health crisis has triggered acute 
realisation of common responsibility for advancing the global health agenda. Subsequently, through 
the problems with availability of anti-retroviral therapy (ARTs) in developing countries, it instigated 
debates about access to generic medicines, which resulted in the disputes between WHO and WTO. 
These disputes, although revealed great imbalances of power between the two regimes, have also 
helped refining the fundamental principles and objectives of the global health system. They have 
paved the way to the strengthening of the rights-based approach to health, especially the enforceability 
to the right to health. This development has been far from straightforward. Over the years, individual 
claims concerning access to medicines and health services have been brought either against individual 
states, or against multinational pharmaceutical companies [89]. Domestic courts in both developed and 
developing countries have used rights transposed into national constitutions from international law, 
including the right to health, right to life, respect for human dignity and the principle of non-discrimination, 
to recognise these claims. 
The consequences of these developments have been manifold. They could be seen as a proof of the 
progressing horizontal effect of human rights and a simple appropriation of the rights discourse by the 
private sector. At the same time, however, these disputes have highlighted the mutual interdependence 
between the global health system and nation states (domestic health care systems). For instance, it 
could be argued that the global health system—now seen as an expression of global social justice—has 
strengthened the nation state, legitimising its legal claims to access to generic drugs against non-state 
actors (international corporations) through health rights litigation at the national and supranational 
level. States used the global health law indirectly to establish equitable access to medicines for their 
citizens. In this respect, global health actually strengthens the position of the state against the power of 
market forces. This in turn enables the juridification of global health law, contributing to its strengthening, 
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expansion, and increased autonomy. The gradual recognition of health rights has helped stabilise the 
normative expectations occurring as a result of the threat constituted, at one level by the actual and 
potential HIV positive status, and at another, by the potential collapse of a health care system. The 
recognition of rights was possible because of the activism and involvement of national and supranational 
courts, which indirectly started assuming quasi-legislative and regulatory functions in the area of 
resource allocation21. Health rights litigation in the context of HIV/AIDS illustrates the claims 
according to which “global interactions in medicine, art, science, etc, …borrow from international human 
rights law a skeletal set of principles to organize their exchanges, and, even where specific regulations 
have not been drafted, the reference to rights means that different functional sectors of global society 
can produce normative constructs to control and temporally to organize their operations. (…) In the 
supra- or transnational arena, rights promote the formation of institutions able to apply power in highly 
abstracted fashion, despite their basic lack of social centration and their weak external support”22. This 
has been true also of the most recent developments in the area of global health. 
3.1.3. Biomedical Revolution and Global Health Law—An Unlikely Connection? 
The third constitutional moment has occurred more recently with the biotechnological revolution in 
medicine. In 2003, Teubner noted that a global health system constitution was being formed in the 
heated internal and external scientific debates about embryo research and reproductive medicine [91]. 
However, 10 years later this argument does not seem sufficiently accurate and should be extended to 
other aspects of biomedicine. The communication and institutionalisation appearing in the area of 
reproductive medicine, genetics, genomics, neuroscience, and other parts of biomedicine are, despite 
the abundance of soft law, the clearest demonstration of constitutionalising tendencies in global health, 
because the legal norms created in this subfield are again assuming the dual function of its self-foundation 
and self-limitation. But of course, as previously mentioned and predicted, they are by no means 
homogeneous or harmonious. 
In 1978, the first test-tube baby was born, marking the beginning of a new era in reproductive 
medicine transforming assisted reproduction techniques and embryo research. As a result of this 
progress the concept of a family has been significantly redefined. Later on prenatal and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis shed a new light on the discussions about eugenics. In 1990, when the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) was launched, scientists were expected to read “the book of life” [92]. On the 
one hand, there was the promise of “a cornucopia of new drugs” and “personalised medicine” [93]. On 
the other hand, “[t]here was the frisson of fear that a genetic helotry would be created, doomed by its 
                                                          
21  The recognition of the role of the judiciary (especially domestic constitutional courts and regional human rights courts) 
in the process of constitutionalisation may cast some doubt over the whole concept of societal constitutionalism, 
because it acknowledges that transnational law and sectorial constitutions are developing through the expansion of the 
public rather than the private sphere. An alternative interpretation would be that transnational constitutions are established 
through a dialectic involvement of both, public and private law. These issues exceed the scope of this paper and will be 
discussed elsewhere. 
22  See [90]. In making this point, Thornhill comes close to acknowledging the observations made by Teubner. The slow 
yet gradual recognition of the right to health at international and national level in a way which strengthens not only the 
global health system, but also the political power of the state might undermine Teubner’s claims about the complete 
separation of the political sphere from other global societal constitutions. 
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DNA to second-class health care, education and employment” [93]. Inevitably, such conceptualizations, 
based on deterministic and reductionist assumptions, raised significant human rights concerns. Finding 
the right balance between human dignity, privacy, autonomy, personhood, identity, freedom of research, 
and interests of society and the state has proven to be one of the most difficult tasks for lawyers and 
policy makers alike [94–102]. Twenty years after the launch of the Human Genome Project, advances 
in genomics that resulted from this research, including DNA collections, direct-to-consumer genetic 
tests, and systems biology are slowly becoming a part of our everyday life not only at the individual or 
state level, but also transnationally/globally. Interdisciplinary research collaborations create extremely 
complex infrastructures for the collection, aggregation, and processing of samples and data23. Biobanks 
are established worldwide24. What is more, through private companies [104] providing genetic testing 
for over 100 traits, diseases and DNA ancestry25, genomic sequence information combined with other 
data sources is freely available on the Web, to people who are not subject to safeguards and professional 
codes of conduct26. The area of direct-to-consumer genetic testing available online remains almost 
unregulated. These developments exacerbate the difficulties with regard to privacy, autonomy, dignity, 
and discrimination. Such growth acceleration of the two highly intertwined regimes—science and 
medicine—has been perceived as excessive and even pathological. Events such as the cloning of 
“Dolly the Sheep”, the whole human genome sequencing, the creation of the first synthetic organism 
(Craig Venter’s “protocell”27), and most recently gene and genome editing [108] instigated heated 
debates about the limits of science and the essence of humanity. It is here that the conflict between 
technological acceleration and the increasing scarcity of time may be most openly experienced [109]. 
This created an acute sense of a crisis in the public view and—“one minute before midnight”—triggered 
protests against uncontrolled expansion and calls for self-limitation. 
All the documents concerning genetics and biomedicine, in particular the Oviedo Convention 1997 
with its additional protocols and the UN and UNESCO Declarations (1997, 2003, 2005)28, complemented 
by a growing body of national laws [110–113] represent an attempt to introduce rules restraining the 
centrifugal tendencies of the biomedical subarea of the global health system. This attempt includes the 
search for appropriate scientific and medical equivalents of traditionally state-related human rights. This 
is how concepts such as prohibition of genetic discrimination, the right to genetic privacy, the right to 
reproductive autonomy, the right to biological origins, and the right to die in dignity have been coined. 
These rights are not clearly and unequivocally directed against the totalizing tendencies of the political 
power of the state. Rather they are called upon to set boundaries and to protect the individual’s mental 
                                                          
23  e.g., Human Genome Project, HapMap Project, 1000 Genomes Project, European Genotype Archive. 
24  The term ‘biobank’ is controversial because it may imply commercial nature of the database or a repository. However, 
it is used here as it seems the most commonly employed by regulators and legal scholars. See: [103]. 
25  Those companies use genotyping and sequencing of the human genome. U.S. National Library of Medicine. See [105]. 
26  For analysis see: [106]. 
27  A synthetic “protocell” is an artificial cell-like particle presenting membrane receptors in a biomimetic manner.  
See also: [107]. 
28  These acts, especially the UNESCO Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and the UN Declaration 
on Reproductive Cloning (2005) are sometimes seen as emerging international customary law, although, these claims 
seem controversial. Despite common practice of state actors, there still seem to be little evidence that either of the 
declarations has actually affected the opinion juris of the international community. 
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and bodily integrity against the expansive tendencies of social institutions (e.g., knowledge, medicine, 
technology). Therefore, in order to make their protection effective, attempts are made to readjust them to 
the rationality and normativity of the subsystem. Of course, it is equally possible that this process of 
redefinition of human rights is primarily orientated at the reduction of intrusions of other actors and 
competing domains [114], thus strengthening and giving preponderance to the global health law regime. 
Similarly, debates about the moral and legal status of the human embryo have led in some countries 
to stark state interventions with regard to reproductive medicine and embryo research29. However, the 
effects of these debates at the global level have been different in comparison with genetics. Apart from 
a few provisions on embryo research in the Oviedo Convention 1997, and the guidelines issued by the 
European Society of Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE)30 [117], there are hardly any regulations 
at all. How then, in light of this latency, is it possible to argue that constitutionalisation is taking place 
also in this area? Here, it is perhaps helpful to highlight the fact that legal issues arising in the context 
of reproductive medicine belong primarily to the sphere of private law (doctor-patient relationship, 
disputes between gamete donors, surrogate mothers and infertile couples, etc.). Constitutional norms play 
secondary role and if they are further extended or strengthened, they develop incrementally remaining 
embedded in the ensemble of legal norms, forming the constitution in long concealed evolutionary 
processes. In a nation state, as well as on a global scale, they also exist latently and are peculiarly 
invisible. According to Teubner, law reconstructs fundamental principles of the functional regime as 
legal principles and fleshes them out in individual constitutional norms ([33], p. 112). What seems to 
be suggested here is that the emergence of constitutional law is a process that involves the depiction of 
certain inherent regime-specific principles as constitutional (which later also become criteria for 
deciding which legal rules will gain a constitutional status). Such substantive constitutional principles 
varying accordingly to historical context could occur as: property, contract, competition, social market 
economy, and ecological sustainability [33]. Without such substantive elements, the constitution would 
be not much more than a collection of procedures. In global health law, we could argue that values 
such as human dignity, autonomy, right to health, and health equality, procedural justice, and 
proportionality do form the basis for the development of constitutional values. 
Recent comparative studies of health rights litigation identified growing congruence between health 
law principles and practices across the world stemming from a cross-cultural imitation between  
legal systems experiencing similar processes of legal, political and economic transition [80,81,118]. 
Commonalities and important paradigm changes can be observed even in areas so resilient to harmonisation 
as abortion law. On of such changes in noticeable liberalization of constitutional reproductive rights in 
Europe, where, as Siegel points out, “[a]fter decades of conflict, a constitutional framework is emerging 
[…] that allows legislators to vindicate the duty to protect unborn life by providing women dissuasive 
counselling and the ability to make their own decisions about abortion” [119]. At the same time, 
however, this intense process of juridification is accompanied by the bifurcation of different forms of 
                                                          
29  e.g., German Act for Protection of Embryos (Embryonenschutzgesetz—ESchG) of 13th December 1990 (BGBl. I S. 
2746, as amended in 2001, BGBl. I S. 2702, 2705); English Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (amended 
by the HFEAct 2008); Spanish Law 14/2006 of 26 May 2006 on Techniques of Assisted Reproduction (BOE, 282, 24 
November 2006 and BOE 284, 26 November 2006) and Law 14/2007 of 3 July 2007 on Biomedical Research (BOE 4 
July 2007), etc. For comparative analysis of laws in the EU see: [115]. 
30  For a list of guidelines issued by ESHRE, see [116]. 
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legality and the perpetual tensions between them. The discrepancies between formal and informal rules, 
between law and other norms, and/or between law and medical practice, which occur in different parts of 
the world, have the potential to create a situation where already restrictive abortion laws are interpreted 
in a way that denies women access to the most basic abortion healthcare services guaranteed by  
law [120]. This might be the reason why human rights and constitutional courts have focused on 
procedural justice, ensuring that appropriate procedures are established and accepted that guarantee the 
full realisation of the existing material rights to legal termination. As noticed by Erdman in respect of the 
European Court of Human Rights: by turning to positive obligations and to procedural rights, the 
European Court seeks to work through rather than against the state. It seeks to engender change by 
drawing on the strength of democratic forces within and by acting with rights- protecting institutions of 
the state, to keep the state at the centre of the system, even while seeking to transform it [121]. Similarly, 
decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in cases such as K.L. v Peru31, L.C. v 
Peru32, L.M.R. v Argentina33, and Paulina Ramirez Jacinto v Mexico34, confirmed and further developed 
women’s right to access legal abortions35. This has been also recently accompanied by another case, in 
which the right to access assisted reproduction services has been successfully argued with reference to 
both anti-discrimination and disability frameworks36. Similarly, at the national level, the Colombian and 
Argentine Supreme Courts have led the way in liberalising abortion laws by reference to the right to 
health (care), the right to life, and/or the right to personality, guaranteed by the recently adopted or 
amended constitutions [124]. 
Seen in this light, the recognition of constitutional norms might paradoxically be easier. We might 
find that they are hidden in particular treaty provisions, national constitutions and court decisions, 
codes of practice, or even research agreements and consent forms. Hence, the main task of medical law 
scholars and policy-makers could be not to insist on further hierarchical codification, but to start 
“revealing” those constitutional norms hidden and concealed in transnational medical practice. 
Consequently, constitutional status could be ascribed to rules such as, the respect of human life in all 
stages of its development, the duty to obtain informed consent before medical interventions, the obligation 
to seek approval of an ethics committee before medical research, the prohibition of human reproductive 
cloning or any modification in the genome of the descendants37, or the currently developing principles of 
data sharing. It has been, therefore, argued that the effects of these recent developments in life sciences 
on legal institutions such as personhood, rights, citizenship, and legitimacy, have been so profound that 
                                                          
31  K.L. v Peru, CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (3 November 2005) (HRC). 
32  L.C. v. Peru, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (4 November 2011). 
33  VDA (on behalf of LMR) v Argentina, Merits, Communication No 1608/2007, UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007, 
IHRL 157 (UNHRC 2011), (29 March 2011), Human Rights Committee [UNHRC]. 
34  Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico, Case 161-02, Report No. 21/07, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/ 
II.130 Doc. 22, rev. 1 (2007). 
35  See [122]. A more skeptical view is presented in [123]. 
36  Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257 (November 28 2012). María 
Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Perú is a precedent for identifying discrimination as being a basis for women’s reproductive 
rights violations. 
37  Classifying the norm prohibiting human reproductive cloning as constitutional does not contradict the earlier statement 
that such a ban does not fulfil the criteria of customary international law. 
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they have redrafted established boundaries between science and law, and state and society. They have 
redefined constitutional frameworks as they have radically restructured state-society relations. They are 
latent in the sense that to date they have not been incorporated in any national or global constitutional 
texts. Nevertheless, it is arguable that these redefined rights and principles can acquire constitutional 
status, especially that they will be followed as binding by the different global players and will form the 
basis of their actions and transnational agreements (e.g., prohibition of commercialisation of human 
body parts or surrogacy agreements). 
This conclusion is strengthened, if we adopt a functional vision of (constitutional) law and accept 
that that contractual rule-making and intra-organizational norm production is not necessarily only 
delegated law-making, which requires recognition by the official legal order. We have to accept that 
sanction is losing the place it once held as the central concept for the definition of law and legal 
validity—for the delineation of the legal from the social and the global from the national [125]. Norms 
predominantly belong to soft law and take the form of declarations, guidelines, codes of practice, 
committees’ decisions, public-private partnership programmes and commercial, private law contracts 
and agreements. This decentralized and non-harmonized body of norms is further complemented by 
other forms of governance, such as standardization through regulations and data sharing. This softness 
should not be seen as a deficiency, but as a typical characteristic of global law, an alternative to  
more formal sets of law [126,127], which provides for the possibility of compromise in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, pluralism and flexibility [128]. This vision sounds very appealing as it allows the 
domain of global health law to include all health programmes, agendas and global partnerships, as well 
as (health care) professional codes of practice. It enables a theorisation of global health law as a 
societal autonomous regime, a transnational regulatory regime, a functional order, or a global fragment. 
However, it is not sufficient in itself to establish whether we are witnessing the emergence of a global 
health constitution. For this further criteria need to be fulfilled. Their identification within the global 
health regime proves to be more difficult and problematic. 
3.2. Reflexive Mechanism in Global Health Constitution 
According to Teubner a societal constitution requires institutions to assure the existence of a variety 
of “reflection centres” that would enable and maintain the accountability of regime’s institutions. 
Global health constitutional norms seem to guarantee the “possibility of dissent” [129] in health, 
through which the “organised-professionalised sphere” of highly rationalised decision-making can be 
challenged by a “spontaneous sphere“ ([33], p. 91) The latter is created through ethics committees, an 
environment supporting “whistle-blowers”, patient or religious groups and civil society organisations, 
expert and non-expert involvement, but also through competition in research (allowing for different 
views to be voiced), and pluralisation of research funding institutions. The main aim of this involvement 
of various stakeholders is to exert pressures on the organised-professional sphere in light of the 
insufficiency of the law. As we already mentioned, legal sanctions are not an effective mechanism to 
impose limitation on a functional regime. Teubner argues that these learning processes should be induced 
by for instance expert knowledge or political power. This is controversial in light of the powerful 
critique of the role of the expert in the process of legalisation, although it seems that what Teubner has 
in mind is predominantly the simple transgression and mutual irritations of different systems. 
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Through constant impulses—derived from public consultations, patient lobbying, ethics committees’ 
assessments, BMA guidelines, WHO opinions, OECD recommendations—societal expectations are 
being communicated to the system, and as a result of political and societal pressures eventually transposed 
into hard law. A perfect example of such learning pressures seems to be the debate and legislative 
process concerning embryo research. Advances in science and their application in medicine sparked 
public imagination and raised fears. The scientific discourse (and methodology) providing a biological 
definition of the embryo was insufficient to accomplish the autonomy of the subsystem. The spontaneous 
sphere embodied in public opinion and various organisations of civil society (patient and religious 
groups) fed their normative expectations into the system through the communication and work of 
special expert committees (the Warnock Committee or the German Parliamentary Committee), which 
made their recommendations. As a result of a long and complex process the principle of respect for 
human life and some restriction of embryo research have made it to the arena of hard law. Using a 
different vocabulary it could be argued that this aspect of societal constitutions describes the need for 
democratic nature of the juridification and constitutionalisation of the regime. Seen from this perspective, 
the existence of reflexive (and in this instance legitimising) mechanisms in global health system is 
more doubtful. The lack of real and sufficient involvement of NGOs in the negotiations preceding the 
Framework Convention of Tobacco Control constituted a major point of contention ([44], p. 69). 
Similarly, it could be argued that some laws in the area of genetic testing or reproductive medicine 
have been imposed on the health care professional or/and against public opinion. On the other hand, 
some rules (e.g., in the Oviedo Convention, UNESCO Declarations) promote public discussions  
and appropriate consultation with regard to fundamental questions raised by the developments of 
biology and medicine38. 
Criteria for the constitutionality of norms require finding genuine constitutional processes and 
structures in the realm of global health. They constitute a return to the concept of self-referential 
reproduction of the legal system rooted in systems theory [6]. Although law plays a merely supporting 
role in societal constitutionalisation (as it is a primarily social process), it is indispensable if we want 
to speak about “constitutions in the strict sense” [33]. The importance of law is also recognised by 
other international lawyers, such as Jan Klabbers, who claims that “…if the label ‘constitutional’ is to 
have any meaning beyond rhetorical, it stands for placing a premium on law, over power, but also over 
other normative orders” [130]. It needs to be remembered that constitutionalisation entails something 
else than “legalization”, understood as an increasing number of treaties, courts and tribunals; it is the 
emergence, creation, and identification of constitution-like elements in an order ([33], p. 8). Reflexive 
mechanism, i.e., “second level” rules, of the societal sectors must be coupled with reflexive mechanism 
of the law. Secondary legal norms “prescribe how the identification, setting, amendment and regulation 
of competences for the issuing and delegating of primary norms are to occur” ([33], p. 106). Autonomous 
regimes produce their own procedural norms on law-making, law-recognition, and legal sanctions. 
Both those elements must be present in a societal constitution. Secondary rule-making in law is 
combined with defining fundamental rationality principles in an autonomous social sphere. It is argued 
here that this is the aspect missing from the regulation of global health care. There are still no visible 
and clear rules defining authority, competences, and mechanisms for the global health law-making. 
                                                          
38  Art. 28 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 4 April 1997 (ETS 164). 
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More importantly, as mentioned earlier, global health law lacks a common legal point of reference to 
appeal to for resolving disagreements or mediating authority to the crowded global health landscape. It 
is uncertain how violations should be handled, and how third parties should be included. In light of the 
great internal diversity, heterogeneity, and lack of synchronised development of different subfields of 
global health the lack of secondary rules make the self-constitutionalisation of global health doubtful. 
Finally, the elements that are most obviously absent from the global health constitution are those 
constitutional structures and institutions that help decide which norms and decisions reached in the 
system are constitutional and which are not, and how to distinguish between constitutional and 
ordinary law. The distinction between ordinary law and constitutional law remains blurred. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper had several aims. First, it was an attempt to build a conceptual framework of global 
health law by combining constitutional theory, and international law together with medical and public 
health law. A normative vision of global health law could potentially be perceived as an instrument 
enabling the less risk-susceptible operation of the system in the future. It could also provide a 
framework for a more comprehensive analysis and meta-analysis of its developments. The underlying 
and primary reason for this study is linked to the difficulties that arise in all areas of global health 
governance today, starting from the lack of leadership and coherence, and finishing with the lack of 
equality and justice. The analysis revealed interesting misconceptions about the area of global health, 
as well as hidden mechanisms and characteristics that need reconceptualization. First of all, it showed 
that the reluctance of medical, constitutional, and international law theorists to engage with each 
other’s discourses is misguided as it stems from a rigid understanding of the concept of law that does 
not take into account the growing body of transnational rules of a non-state provenience. It is also 
harmful, because it hinders a more coherent development of global health law and consequently the 
achievement of global health goals. Global health system does not fit squarely either into the traditional 
concepts of constitutionalism and international law. However, by excluding this area from their 
analysis, constitutionalists and international lawyers deprive themselves of the chance to provide a 
truly comprehensive analysis of the harsh realities of global law and subsequently the possibility to 
enrich the constitutionalisation debate. 
Second and crucially, the article aimed to examine whether and, if so, to what extent, the system of 
global health law is undergoing a process of constitutionalisation. The paper used Teubner’s concept 
of societal constitutionalism as a point of reference in the discussion, because of its potential to 
conceptualise the developments taking place within the system of global health law. The study has 
shown that a global health law constitution is slowly emerging from a complex and multicentric 
process of juridification, punctuated by several constitutional moments. However, constitutionalisation 
has not yet reached the density required to achieve the right balance between autonomy of the system 
and responsibility for its environment. An astonishing observation followed. Namely, that the most 
recent constitutional moment occurred in the area of biomedical law, positioned at the intersection of 
science and medicine. It is surprising because the technological developments are so recent (whereas 
the constitutionalisation is traditionally conceptualised as an old event of mature orders), but most 
importantly because prima facie, global biomedical law (in the sense of binding law) is difficult to 
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identify, especially in the field of reproductive medicine and research. Here too, an important 
discovery has been made. A closer look into this issue reveals that constitutional norms are not 
captured in one document or a treaty, but that they are hidden in different international, national, and 
transnational acts, including private agreements or decisions of domestic or regional courts. This 
finding could have potentially significant theoretical and practical consequences. It could be argued 
that the relevance of constitutional and human rights courts in the development of global health 
constitutional principles casts some doubt over Teubner’s claims that the creation of transnational law 
now falls primarily within the domain of private actors and adjudicative bodies. It seems to indicate 
that transnational law formation is a process driven by a complex correlation between the private and 
the public sphere. This finding, could in turn redirect the efforts towards attempts to identify and 
empirically construct legal norms within the system of global health. This analysis and construction of 
global health law might be one of the most important tasks for future lawyers and policy-makers in the 
whole area of global health governance. The constructivist approach is based on the assumption that 
despite the transformation of the concept of law at the global level, it is still possible to distinguish 
between law and non-law, and that law retains its creative function to influence policy changes (e.g., 
access to treatment, legality of embryo research). At the same time, it recognises that “law is also a set of 
conceptual categories and schema that help construct, compose, communicate, and interpret social 
relations’ [131]. Therefore, it acknowledges that the meaning of law as a social institution could be 
understood not only by examining its aims and effects, but also by studying the ways it is actually 
experienced and understood in the life-world, and used in the everyday life of ordinary people. Thus, 
future research should aim to evaluate the emergence of the GHL system by analysing the collective 
construction of legality, i.e., how forms of consciousness combine to constitute ideological or hegemonic 
legality [132]. The findings of such research should then be evaluated against the background of 
different theories of transnational law (including those proposed by Kingsbury, Thornhill, and Walker) 
to reveal any potential discrepancies between theory and practice. This approach provides a foundation 
for positive social science assessment of the causes and consequences of global health law phenomena, 
and for philosophical and political normative assessments of which interests are served and disserved, 
and what the implications might be in relation to various conceptions of justice ([62], p. 24). 
Finally, with regard to practical consequences, the analysis has shown that what might be obstructing 
or delaying the achievement of systemic autonomy of global health law is not so much the lack of 
legalisation, but the insufficient development of constitutional processes and structures. The creation 
of “secondary rules” that show how to identify the foci of decision-making in a particular situation and 
moment in time could indirectly contribute to the solution of two difficult problems in the area of 
global health, namely legitimacy and effectiveness. Creation of institutional structures that would help 
resolve conflicts between rules and different organisational and professional rationales rather than 
adoption of more primary rules and principles in declarations and treaties should be the next fundamental 
goal for the global health governance. This could be achieved by focusing on bottom-up processes of 
global health law formation, although attempts of global codification and treaty formation do not need 
to be seen as obstacles, but complementary to this process. However, according to the systems-theoretical 
approach they should not be expected to bring unity or stability. Of course, such a conclusion is hardly 
satisfactory. Teubner does not give us the answer to the crucial question, of “how exactly?” we are to 
achieve the full formation of a societal constitution. Following systems theory, we can suspect that the 
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answer would be to open communication channels and enhance platforms of communications. At the 
same time, it is important to remember that more communication does not necessarily bring unity or 
even harmonisation; it can merely help reveal the processes that are taking place within the regime. 
Nevertheless, such communication could strengthen the position of global health in the global arena. 
As aptly noted by Mireille Delmas-Marty, “the problem is that dialogue is not enough. It can pave the 
way towards legal approximation, but cannot build it, and it doesn’t resolve the issue of pluralism’s 
limits” ([55], p. 51). What she proposes is an image of “orderly clouds”, representing the concept of 
pluralist harmonisation that respects each part and enables their harmonious expression. It is to be 
achieved by various means, such as cross-reference, harmonisation through the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation, hybridisation through common grammar (guiding meta-principles), and most importantly 
“polychrony” as a means of dealing with the lack of synchronisation between states ([89], pp. 149–50) 
(and perhaps subareas within regimes). “Ordering pluralism is the art of blending rhythms and combining 
speeds as precisely as possible—here again, adjusting—to the energy and interia specific to each society. 
(…) Finding the most well-adapted breaks and accelerations for our societal chariots would prove the 
wisdom of good governance” ([89], p. 54). This temporal approach to constitutionalisation might 
complement and support the accomplishment of the responsible self-foundation of the global health law. 
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